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Hal Colebatch*
The "Problem" of Rural Local Government
Ten years ago, it was a commonplace of writings on politics and
administration in underdeveloped countries that there was an urgent
need to build up strong systems of local government based on
popularly-elected councils at the local level. In some cases, this was
in part a response to decolonisation: it was felt that as the expatriate
generalist administrators withdrew, they would have to be replaced
by different sorts of governmental structures which would be able to
command a wider popular acceptance of their actions. And in the
broader perspective, local government was seen as contributing to a
wide range of general governmental aims, a belief which was
summarized by the title of one of the best-known books on this
theme: Demo crac y, Decentralisation and Development, Maddick,
1963.
Today, there is less confidence in representative local institutions. In
a number of African and Asian states, elected local councils have
been abolished, stripped of their powers, or brought under
administrative control. Even among those who previously
championed the cause of decentralisation, the devolution of powers
to elected local authorities is said to have "failed"; the councils, it is
said, were inefficient and corrupt, and by their parochialism hindered
the "nation-building" activities of the central government. The latter
was, therefore, compelled to intervene to restrain or even abolish the
councils.
There are, of course, counter-arguments to this theme. It is argued,
for instance, that councils were given enormous responsibilities but
inadequate resources, and that the actions of central governments
tended to reduce, rather than strengthen, the capacity of councils to
meet their responsibilities. But we are unlikely to reach an
understanding of the process involved simply by comparing the
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arguments of the opposing sides: what is needed is a series of case
studies to show why, in specific political contexts, decentralised
institutional structures did not prove durable. This paper is drawn
from one such case study, in Kenya, and is based on research carried
out in Kenya between 1971 and 1973
The Institutional Framework in Kenya
The main services devolved to representative local bodies in Kenya
were primary education, minor roads and health services below the
hospital level. In the rural areas, these were the responsibility of the
county councils, which were established at the district level (with
two exceptions) to succeed the former African district councils and
European county and district councils. Districts range in size from
214 to 77,900 sq km (median size 5,800 sq km) and in population
from 22,400 to 782,600 (median 185,000). Most councillors are
chosen by direct election from single-member constituencies,
although there have been no elections since 1968, and no contested
elections since 1966. There is a small number of nominated
members, and the district commissioner (DC) has regained his seat
on the council (having lost it between 1963 and 1964), though he no
longer chairs the meetings or has a formal veto over its activities, as
his colonial predecessor did.
When the councils were responsible for these services, the actual
control was in the hands of an officer-in-charge (OIC), variously
termed the county education officer, medical officer of health, or
works officer, who reported to a specialist committee of the council;
the committee's decisions then had to be ratified by the full meeting
of the council. While these OICs were, in formal terms, servants of
the council, in the cases of education and health services, the OIC
was a central government official, posted (not seconded) by his
ministry to the council, responsible to the ministry as well as the
council, and liable to be transferred to another post at the ministry's
discretion. Only the roads OIC was unambiguously a council
employee.
During this time, there was considerable expansion of these services,
1 A preliminary report on this research is contained in IDS Discussion Paper no.
38,(Colebatch, 1974a); a fuller analysis can be found in Colebatch, 1974b,
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particularly primary education, but the councils' handling of them
was often criticised - for inefficient administration, for poor service,
for parochialism, for corruption, but above all, for their financial
performance. Councils appeared to be perennially on the verge of
bankruptcy, failing to pay employees' wages (particularly teachers)
on occasion, and sometimes dismissing teachers when funds were
insufficient to pay them.
Giving the "financial crisis" of the councils as the major reason, the
central government announced in October 1969 that these three
services would be taken over by its own ministries. After this transfer
of functions, the councils remained in existence, but their
importance was greatly diminished and they had no direct voice in
service operation, apart from the presence of the council clerk on the
District Education Boards which were set up three years later.
The question is, of course, how to explain this pattern of change.
Explanations have been sought in a number of directions, of which
three seem to be of particular importance: the actual operation of
the services, the nature of the financial arrangements supporting
them, and the broader pattern of political and administrative change
in Kenya. I will consider these in turn.
Service operation
As I have mentioned, the quality of these services during the county
council period (1964-69) was often criticised and the transfer of
functions is often explained in these terms: the councils were
running the services badly, therefore it was necessary for the central
government to take them over (and, by implication, to run them
well). To adherents of this view, the real question about service
operation is simply "Does the central government run them better
than the councils did?"
In many respects, though, this is the wrong question, since it ignores
the extent to which the central government was involved in the
operation of these services before the transfer of functions. We have
already noted that in the cases of education and health services, the
OIC was a central government official. The medical officer of
health, in particular, performed a wide range of functions for which
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he was reponsible only to the ministry. And primary education was
subject to central government regulation in a number of important
respects: syllabi, teacher training, examinations and, above all,
progress from primary to secondary school. In fact, for these two
services, it is probably more accurate to speak of services under
broad central government control, but subject to county council
pressures at certain critical points - in particular, over questions of
service expansion.
This does not apply, however, to roads, where for a number of
reasons, there was a much clearer distinction between the central
government service and that of the councils. One important factor
here was the fact that it was convenient for the central ministry to
limit its role to that of providing a high-standard trunk road service.
Another was that the council services were constantly dealing with
"microdecisions" about small, marginal changes in service provision
- e.g. whether to send a grader to work on one untrafficable road or
on another - which were of vital importance to their clients. A third
was that council road staff were less insulated from the polixical
control structure than either their central counterparts or council
staff in the other services. With roads, therefore, the councils were
more clearly in control, and offered a more distinctive service - less
clearly defined in its scope, and more responsive to pressures from
councillors, than the other services.
Given the extent of central control before the transfer, it is not
surprising that there was no major change in the operation of the
education and health services after it. The control of the OIC was
strengthened, and the institutional channels for the expression of
client interests restricted, by the effective abolition of the education
and health committees of the councils. But there were other
channels, and the 01G found that some areas of control still eluded
him. Demands for school expansion were put directly to the 01G,
and in the context of the whole Kenyan political structure, were
difficult to resist. And he was no more able to amalgamate or close
schools with low enrolments than he had been before the transfer: he
had the formal powers to do so, but not the political support needed.
Client pressures on the health services continued to grow, with
"self-help" being used as a means of making a demand for service
LOCAL COUNCILS AND LOCAL SERVICES 17
expansion: local leaders would organise the construction of a
building, describe it as a "self-help health centre", and press the
central government to "take it over". In this process, the district 01G
was often by-passed, and appeals made direct to the ministry.
In the roads case, the transfer brought more changes. The ministry
sought to make the local service more "professional": senior
ex-council staff were transferred to other districts to break personal
links between clients and service officials, new equipment was
brought in and new procedures introduced, and the boundaries of
the service clearly defined. This last step, however, was resisted not
only by clients and their representatives, but also by a number of
other officials, since it excluded from the possibility of service a wide
range of roads which had received occasional attention from the
councils, and also greatly reduced their own possible influence over
the service. The ministry resisted pressures to be more "flexible" at
the local level, but was eventually obliged to accept the creation of
Rural Access Road Units (RARUs). These were set up to offer the
sort of marginal service which the ministry itself was trying to avoid,
and while they were located within the ministry, their operations
were subject to the effective control of the district commissioner -
i.e., control was not vested in the "professionals".
Even from this brief discussion of service operation under council
and ministry, it is clear that there was a good deal of continuity
before and after the transfer, particularly in the cases of education
and health services, and that where major changes did occur (in the
case of roads), they were sometimes dysfunctional and led to
compensating changes in the form of the establishment of the
RARUs. This proposition is unremarkable in itself, but important in
the context of the argument that the cause of the transfer of
functions was the poor performance of the councils as service
operators: if this were so, one would expect to find significant
changes in service operation after the transfer. In fact, it is difficult
to find evidence of internal pressures within the services that
compelled the central government to take over responsibility for
them.
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Financial Considerations
Finance was undoubtedly the most controversial aspect of service
operation under the councils: the councils were accused of
extravagance, financial irresponsibility and corruption, and in turn
accused the central government of starving them of the funds
necessary to carry out their functions. Councils frequently
experienced spectacular "financial crises", during which staff
(especially untrained teachers) would be dismissed and schools and
dispensaries closed, for want of funds.
These "crises" were often held to be evidence of the financial
incompetence of the councils, and hence of the need for the central
government to take responsibility for these services. But the
explanation is more complex. It must be noted that while in theory
councils were autonomous bodies, most of their sources of revenue
were controlled by the central government. Graduated personal tax
accounted for a quarter of council revenue, but the tax rate was set
by the central government, and the tax itself collected by
government, not council officials. Moreover, the central government
on several occasions reduced the tax rates to buy political support.
Another major revenue source was school fees, and these too could
not be changed without central government approval - which was
not given. The central government also abolished other council
revenue sources, such as dispensary fees and the maize cess, neither
consulting the councils beforehand nor compensating them
afterwards.
The councils were therefore dependent on their own accumulated
reserves, and on central government grants, to finance the continued
provision of services. And central grants were not seen by the
government as fixed and predictable revenue sources for the councils,
but as ex gra tía payments to enable councils otherwise unable to
balance their budgets to do so. Until 1967 there was not even a
formula for allocating grants; in that year, one was introduced (at
least on paper) but in May 1969 it was admitted that "because of a
shortage of funds", grants were only being paid to local authorities
"which had art actual cash shortage".
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The message for councils was clear: those that scrupulously tailored
their expenditure to their revenue would largely be left on their own,
whereas those which found themselves in a financial "crisis" wouki
be bailed out by the government. It is scarcely surprising, therefore,
that "crises" came to be increasingly frequent and prolonged, and
that by 1968, the estimated aggregate expenditure of the councils
exceeded their aggregate revenue by over £K2.8m. What was
developing, in fact, was a regular system of "crisis financing": a
council would, through a combination of necessity and design,
exhaust its reserves so that if, for instance, it failed to receive a grant
to which it was entitled, it would suffer an immediate cash crisis. It
would then lay off teachers, provoking union protests in Nairobi
which would lead to inter-ministerial negotiations and ultimately to
the release of more funds for the council.
"Crisis financing", therefore, was not necessarily a sign of financial
incompetence on the part of the councils; in fact, it was the most
rational response to the rules of the game as they then applied. As a
problem, it was "solved" by the transfer of functions, just as the
problem of a sore thumb is "solved" by the amputation of the arm:
the question is why the government choc this sort of response,
rather than other alternatives such as reallocation of revenue sources,
or application of more stringent rules about grant allocation. This
will become clearer in the next section. As for the volume of
spending on these services, the evidence suggests that to some extent
it increased at a faster rate after the transfer, but not as an immediate
consequence: most of the increase, in fact, could be attributed to
specific items like increases in teachers' pay and the spending of the
proceeds of an IBRD loan for new road plant. In general, there is
little evidence to suggest that the transfer was primarily aimed at
providing more money for the services.
Political Change
The discussion so far, like most analyses of this question, has
focussed on factors within the services themselves - the
administration and financing of the service agencies. But it has
yielded no clear rationale for the transfer of functions, and this, I
would argue, is because the transfer can only be understood in the
context of the pattern of political change in Kenya over this period.
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It is important to remember that the original decision to vest these
services in the county councils was part of a wider strategy aimed at
reducing the power of the central government. KADU, the minority
party, had demanded a regionalist constitution, with substantial
devolution of power from the centre to the regions, and from the
regions to the councils - in other words, a radical transformation of
the structure of the colonial state. This was reluctantly accepted by
the KANU government as the price of independence, but not as the
basis of a permanent constitution, and within twelve months of
independence the regional governments had effectively been
abolished, and the centralised structure of government restored. In
particular, the provincial administration regained the pre-eminence it
had enjoyed in the colonial political order, and provincial and district
commissioners were designated the personal representatives of the
president in their areas.
This constitutional change had been made possible by the merger, in
November 1964, of the two parliamentary parties, KANU and
KADU. An opposition party, the Kenya People's Union, was formed
in 1966 but was subject to extensive harassment by the government
and eventually banned in 1969. The government has since made it
quite clear that although the law may permit the formation of
political parties, the government will not: in June 1974 the president
warned that anyone who tried to form an opposition party to
contest the forthcoming parliamentary elections would be
"physically crushed". The government has also extended its control
over other forms of organisation which might be used to present an
organised challenge to the government. The colonial controls over
trade unions, co-operatives and other associations have been retained
and strengthened, and steps have been taken to achieve effective
government control over new forms of organisation such as self-help
groups.
In addition, the government has secured a critical role for itself in the
allocation of economic opportunities. Land acquired from departing
white settlers and subdivided for settlement is distributed by the
government, and allocated by bodies chaired by the district
commissioner. Other government agencies allocate licences for retail
trade, distributorships for wholesale trade, and the loans which
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enable Africans to break into the protected commercial sphere. The
government wields the carrot as well as the stick.
The pattern, then, is of a general expansion of state power over a
wide range of economic, social and political life, together with the
repression of possible organisational bases for challenging those
presently in control of the state structure. The consequence is a form
of "consultative politics", in which a generalist administrative
hierarchy - the provincial administration - consults with local
notables at various levels to secure their acquiescence in
governmental activities, conceding in return some of the favours
which they seek on behalf of themselves and their clients.
In this context, the county councils represented an area of activity
not fully subordinated to the machinery of state control, and there
was constant pressure from the provincial administration for full
control over the councils - e.g. by trying to wrest from the ministry
of local government the right to approve council estimates, and by
trying to secure for the DC a general veto over council activities. The
problems of the council services were used as a lever to try to
strengthen the dominance of the DCs over the councils, and while
the problems were usually real enough, they were often only the
issues over which an underlying structural conflict was fought out.
Policy Implications
This analysis carries a number of policy implications in respect of the
Kenyan situation in particular. It is clear that the "problem" of the
county council services was not primarily about efficiency in service
provision, or the adequacy of service finance, although these were
important factors. The real question was what sort of response would
be made to operational and financial strains in service provision by
decision-makers in a state structure which was very much concerned
to expand its own authority. As we have seen, the response made -
the transfer of council functions to the ministries - was primarily a
change in political control: it did not necessarily result in any
changes in service operation of finance, and where it did, the changes
were sometimes unanticipated and dysfunctional. The perspective
which sees the "problem" as stemming from the inadequacies of the
councils, and forcing the central government to "take action" is
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quite misleading. The government itself was the cause of much of the
problem, and its "solution" was clearly geared to its own interests in
expanding state authority. (More detailed policy implications for
Kenya are discussed in Colebatch, 1974a, especially chapter ten).
There are also a number of more general policy implications. One is
that any analysis of the "local service problem" must specify very
precisely the relationships involved. In the Kenyan case, primary
education and health services were said to be run by the councils, but
in fact the role of the central government was probably as prominent
as that of the councils. And for the most part, the ministries
operated with the same staff and facilities as the councils had before
them. For these two services, therefore, the most significant impact
of the transfer of functions was the way it redefined the relationship
between the 01G and the coundillors - still an important change, but
not as complete a break with the past as was sometimes assumed.
In particular, the term "local" needs to be kept within a specific
context of political and administrative relationships. There is a
tendency for "local" to be seen as an absolute, definitive term:
"local" services are inefficient, "local" politicians are parochial and
corrupt - as though these were inherent characteristics, independent
of any organisational relationship. In this sort of analysis, council
financing in Kenya is described as "chaotic", and the fact that it was
rational and effective in the context of the total system is
conveniently overlooked. Similarly, the massive expansion of
secondary schooling is said to derive from "local" pressures, and not
from the whole structure of reward in Kenyan society, which
allocates to a secondary school-trained employee an income ten or
fifteen times that of the average farmer, and which rests on policy
decisions taken at the national level.
One final point which needs to be made is that local service
structures have to perform rather different tasks from those of the
ministeries in the national capital. When comparing alternative
service structures, therefore, the real comparison is not between local
authorities and the ministries, but between local authorities and the
sort of structures that ministries establish at the local level to deliver
services - including machinery for client contact and service
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definition as well as the "technical" task of actually giving the
service. The Kenyan roads example is a case in point: the ministry
replaced the councils' road organisations with
hierarchically-controlled structures which were better at performing
the technical task of road maintenance but less effective at securing
broad agreement (among clients, representatives and other officials)
over questions of service definition, procedures and priorities: which
roads should receive maintenance, when, and to what extent?
Eventually a separate road organisation was set up which would be
able to establish closer rapport with clients and the governmental
structure, and in so doing, shield the ministry from some of the
pressures on it from these groups.
And this, of course, illustrates the whole point of rural local
government as a service agency: it offers one way of coping with the
problem of marginal service. The major service needs in any field,
like trunk roads, are easy to see: it is the minor ones, like simple
feeder roads, which pose the greatest problems for the service
agency. The agency has to face the question of whether service at
this very iow level is warranted at all, and if so, where the service (the
road, the school or the dispensary) is to be located. And while these
decisions are marginal to the service agency, they are of great
importance to the clients of the service, and in underdeveloped
countries, often of critical importance: the question of whether a
community has, or does not have, a school or a feeder road can mean
a whole qualitative change in the sort of life open to its members.
Local government, then, is one institutional way of dealing with the
problem of marginal service: it provides for clearly-designated client
representatives, and for service officials to be (to a greater or lesser
extent) subordinate to them. It may or may not prove to be an
effective way of settling questions of marginal service, but abolishing
local authorities does not make these questions go away: they remain
to confront the central service face-to-face, as it were. This was the
problem which the Kenyan central road organisation faced after the
transfer of functions: it had to make decisions about a multitude of
tiny road problems from which it had previously been insulated by
the existence of the county councils. And the outcome was the
creation of a new road organisation specifically for these marginal
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questions, which will presumably be as "inefficient" as those of the
county councils were said to be. If there is a moral for policy-makers
in this, it is that it is easier to see the defects of local authorities than
to work out how central agencies can at the same time maintain their
technical "efficiency" and deal adequately with the problems of
service provision at the margin.
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